MetaDAO 2.0
Seven proposal types with their own rules, and a performance package both sides can renegotiate
MetaDAO 2.0 changes two parts of the protocol every raise runs on: how a funded company makes decisions, and how the founder's performance package pays out. Escrow, refunds, allocation and the price you pay all work as they did, so committing to a raise is unchanged. What you are backing afterwards is what changes.
Every new raise launches on 2.0. A company that raised before it keeps its current rules until it adopts 2.0 through a proposal.
Proposals come in seven types
Until now every proposal ran the same market length against the same pass threshold, whatever it asked for. Under 2.0 a proposal picks one of seven types. For every type except the catch-all, the program builds the transaction itself from a fixed template, so what traders price is exactly what executes. Each type also carries its own market length and pass bar, scaled to how much it can hurt backers.
| Type | Market | Pass bar | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Large treasury spend | 1.5 days | −10% | Team must sponsor |
| Change the monthly budget | 5 days | +5% | Team must sponsor |
| Create new tokens | 5 days | +5% | Amount and recipient fixed |
| Token buyback | 10 days | +10% | 90 days between buybacks |
| Anything else | 10 days | +10% | The catch-all |
| Replace the team | 20 days | +10% | The backers' route |
| Liquidate the treasury | 10 days | +25% | The backers' route |
The pass bar compares the two time-weighted average prices of a decision market. At +10% the pass average has to finish at least 10% above the fail average. At −10%, a team-sponsored spend passes unless the market prices it more than 10% worse on average. That keeps routine spending quick while a 25% bar guards liquidation.
A MetaDAO committee can cancel a proposal, but only one that is out of line with the protocol. Using the catch-all to liquidate a treasury is invalid, because liquidation has its own type with its own 25% bar. A proposal designed to harm the protocol is the other case. Outside those two, the committee leaves the market to decide.
Two types belong to backers: replacing the team and liquidating the treasury. Anyone can propose a liquidation. Replacing the team can't be proposed yet. A failed takeover waits 20 days before the next attempt and a failed liquidation waits 10, so neither can be used to wear a team down.
The performance package can adapt
The unlock ladder stays. A founder's tranches still unlock only when the 3-month average price holds at 2x, 4x, 8x, 16x and 32x the price backers paid. What changes is what happens after a tranche unlocks, and how the terms can change later.
Unlocking and withdrawing are separate steps. An unlocked tranche stays in the package until the founder withdraws it, either as tokens or by selling into the company's own trading pool and receiving dollars.
A package can carry withdrawal limits. It can cap how many tokens, and how many dollars' worth, leave per window, say which of the two routes is open, and set a date after which the caps lapse. Token withdrawals count at the higher of the pool's average and live price, so a dip does not stretch the cap. A package without limits leaves both routes open and uncapped.
Terms are renegotiated between both sides. Either the company, acting through a proposal, or the founder can propose new terms, and the other side approves them. The lock date and the withdrawal limits can move this way.
If MetaDAO retires a package, the founder is paid what had already unlocked and every still-locked token is destroyed.
For what changed in allocation and Ownership Score, read Allocation.